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ABSTRACT: In the beginning of his book The Peloponnesian War, Thucydides 
gave the account of the Peloponnesian war as the greatest motion ever. He claimed 
so without giving sufficient explanations. His later analogy, which compared war to 
a “violent teacher”, reveals his insight into the fundamental conflict between nature 
and law. This conflict as a basic element of human condition is well illustrated by 
war itself. In this sense Thucydides’ opinion about the Peloponnesian war as the 
greatest one becomes understandable.   
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The puzzling greatness of the Peloponnesian war 
In the opening part of The Peloponnesian War, Thucydides made two remarkable assertions. The 
first one is the claim on his identity as "an Athenian" in the first sentence of the book1. 
Considering his impartial narration in the whole book, one cannot help wondering what this 
claim of identity tried to remind its readers. Did it mean to alert the readers that this report of war 
might have some inevitable flaws on its integrity or objectivity due to the author’s involvement? 
Or, did it simply infer some connection between his actual impartial attitude of narrative and 
certain characteristic of Athenians?  
The other assertion, however, is even more puzzling. It is Thucydides’ evaluation on the 
significance of the Peloponnesian war as “the greatest commotion that ever happened among the 
Grecians, reaching also … to most nations.”2 This claim appears to be so ambitious, if not 
exaggerating, that one who intends to treat this claim seriously has to seek Thucydides’ textual 
support onto his confidence. How can he be sure that what he was experiencing was the peak 
moment in the history of “most nations”? Though he discussed the weakness of the ancient 
people who dwelled in the Greek region closely following the above assertion, he kept silent 
about the other nations, which were even unknown to him. His narrations on the war smoothly 
covered this silence, but the obvious lack of explanation is still disturbing. How can a war--as a 
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temporary, regionally and ethically limited incidence--have its universal significance secured?  
Moreover, there is a more urgent question on Thucydides’ regard of this war’s greatness. In what 
sense can this war be regarded as a great one, let alone the greatest? Considering Dionysius 
Halicarnassius’ criticism on Thucydides’ lack of honorable and fortunate materials in his report, 
which was merely about the brutish war itself, one question arises unavoidably—what is 
Thucydides’ standard about greatness? All Thucydides wrote about, in Halicarnassius’ words, 
was no more than “an evil argument in hand”3, without anything noble or wonderful. Besides, as 
Hobbes commented, Thucydides appeared to have no “affection to either side, and not as a lover 
of his country but of truth”4. He did not end his story with one side’s triumph; during the whole 
process of the war, neither side in Thucydides’ narration showed overwhelming advantage of 
power, nobility or virtue. Then in whose stance did Thucydides think about the greatness of this 
war? It cannot be the same as common sense, which evaluates the greatness of war according to 
the winner’s achievement in territory, wealth or fame. This kind of greatness belongs to a certain 
side in war, not the war itself. Thucydides, however, with his unusual neutral stance, appointed 
no one to carry his praise, but let the war itself accomplish this.  
One of Thucydides’ explicit opinions of war can prove his admiration. In Book III, Chapter 82, 
when he talked about the heinous things which happened in wartime, he wrote:  
“For in peace and prosperity as well cities as primate men are better minded because they 
be not plunged into necessity of doing anything against their will; but war, taking away the 
affluence of daily necessaries, is a most violent teacher and conformeth most men’s 
passions to the present occasion.”  
War is called “a violent teacher”, rather than a devil or a beast; and what is concerned here is 
“war” rather than “the war” or “this war.” War is admired here as teacher, or the radical and 
universal form of motion. The Peloponnesian war is the greatest but not the only great one; its 
greatness is outstandingly different from other wars in degree, not in kind. Moreover, 
Thucydides’ analogy of “teacher” infers his unspoken rationale. First, teaching is a decent 
occupation; war, with all its brutality, to Thucydides must also possess some decency in its nature. 
Secondly,  a teacher should have something true to teach; therefore, by comparing war to a 
teacher, Thucydides must have got some insight into war’s provision, from which people can 
learn some kind of truth. A remaining point here is that Thucydides still kept his neutral stance 
when he admired war as a teacher. It means that what this violent teacher can teach is open to all 
men in all wars. The lesson of war must be a neutral, or universal, knowledge applying to all men. 
Furthermore, considering that Thucydides characterized war the teacher only with its “taking 
away the affluence of daily necessaries”, it is fair to say that such universal knowledge will not 
be some kind of scientific knowledge, such as arts of launching attacks or debating with enemies. 
Instead, it should be some teaching on the same intellectual level of the possible teaching taught 
by “daily necessaries” in peacetime. Therefore it is fair to assume that what war teaches is 
knowledge of the nature.  By teaching about nature, war the teacher earns its decency.  
Leo Strauss gave a thought provoking comment on this war/teacher analogy. He wrote in 
“Thucydides’ Peloponnesian war” that  
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War is a “violent teacher”: it teaches men not only to act violently but also about violence 
and therewith about the truth. War is a violent teacher not only of everyone except 
Thucydides but also of Thucydides himself. Taught by that teacher Thucydides presents 
the war as it unfolds … In doing this he could not help presenting his own conversion 
from the peace time view to the war time view or his most advanced education.5 
Strauss’ interpretation on the war/teacher analogy added, or disclosed, another issue within. The 
adjective “most advanced” is used by Strauss but not by Thucydides himself. It is not hard to 
understand that there is another kind of education that teaches men not only act peacefully but 
also about peace—actually, that is everyone’s daily peacetime experience. But why is the 
education of war more advanced, even the most advanced? To answer this question, one needs to 
start from an inquiry on the two kinds of educations, i.e. the wartime education and the peace 
time education. 
Two kinds of education given by peace and war 
According to Thucydides’ narration on the history prior to war, peace is always conditional. 
Thucydides mentioned at least three examples on this. First, in the old time when people living in 
Greece had not shared the name Hellas, there was no distinction between barbarians and 
Grecians. People just “became thieves and went abroad under the conduct of their most puissant 
men … and made this the best means of their living; being a matter at that time nowhere in 
disgrace but rather carrying with it something of glory.”6 Peace came after war, i.e. after such 
violent times. Second, the long peace gifted to Athens, due to which Athenians had a unique 
chance to develop her culture and to accumulate her wealth, was resulted from no desirable 
fortune but mere the sterility of its soil.7 Peace lasted long in Attic incidentally only because this 
place had nothing people would fight for.  The third example is different from the first two--the 
peace between Athens and Sparta prior to the Peloponnesian war was not accidental. It was a 
man-made peace, which was not an independent situation. It depended on a thirty years’ peace 
treaty8, which was also a divine treaty. Peace, in Thucydides’ narration, is always under the 
shadow of war. It is either resulted from war’s absence by chance, or guaranteed by divine 
treaties made after wars—not only the thirty years’ one, but also the innumerable short ones after 
every battle.  
Therefore, if peace has its teaching, such teaching should be about, first of all, its conditions. 
Since it would not be an education on unreliable chance, it would be an education based on 
divine treaties, i.e. on the divinity and the laws. Divinity or gods here, however, as laws’ 
defenders, are subject to the laws. As Plato wrote in Laws, the laws are superior to wisdom of 
every kind, including that of the gods.9 Hence the education by peace is mainly the education by 
laws. The laws sanctified the peace—the former starts and maintains the latter. Law-abiding 
defines the standard of the justice. Moreover, when Corinthians urged Sparta to wage a war 
against Athens by criticizing Sparta’s caution, the first thing they stressed was Sparta’s fidelity in 
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their constitution10. Similarly, in Pericles’ famous funeral speech, the first thing he praised about 
Athens was that they Athenians had unique and admirable laws, which made them a pattern to 
other states11. Laws are critical measures of polis justice as such.  
War, however, is characterized by law-breaking. Laws cannot provide remedy in war time, 
because the concern about live or die overcomes the concern about right or wrong. As 
Thucydides wrote, war “conformeth most men’s passions to the present occasion.”12 War, as a 
dark background of relatively temporary peace, teaches men about another way to deal with the 
situations happening according to people’s passions rather than conventional virtues or 
piety—“sincerity was laughed down… no speech was so powerful nor oath terrible enough to 
disband.”13 On the other hand, even though people in war abandon their laws and piety, they are 
not unreasonably violent, not simply enjoying killing. According the Thucydides’ thought on war, 
people still keep their rationality. While in peacetime people put the highes to authority to the 
divinity of laws, in wartime they also have some position which they can appeal to—they appeal 
to the nature of man, to the natural need to survive and prosper. What happens in war is no more 
than that “the nature of man, which is wont even against law to do evil, gotten now above the law, 
showed itself with delight to be too weak for passion, too strong for justice, and enemy to all 
superiority.”14 The fall of laws is accompanied with the rise of human nature. War as a teacher 
gives an education about human nature in the first place. 
Therefore, the different educations of peace and war can be reduced to the educations of law and 
nature. Thucydides’ concept of human nature is featured with a continuous possibility to go 
against laws. This concept has been briefly expressed in Diodotus’ speech, which meant to 
appease people’s haste and anger upon Mytilenaeans’ betrayal by arguing that the executive force 
of laws cannot tame the wild nature of man:  
 
“They have it by nature, both men and cities, to commit offences; nor is there any law that 
can prevent it… And it is likely that gentler punishments were inflicted of old even upon 
the most heinous crimes; but that in tract of time, men continuing to transgress, they were 
extended afterwards to the taking away of life; and yet they still transgress… In a word, it 
is a thing impossible and of great simplicity to believe when human nature is earnestly 
bent to do a thing that by force of law or any other danger it can be diverted.”15 
 
According to this speech, the tension between law and nature cannot be eliminated, because the 
law-breaking nature is so daring that the force of law is always too weak to overwhelm it. The 
threat brought by nature against the laws is identical with the threat of war against peace. The 
divine treaties cannot always keep their validities until their official expiration date; the fact that 
there is always an expiration date in peace pacts implies that peacetime is always temporary. 
Peace presupposes war, as law presupposes the natural intention of law-breaking, or in Strauss’ 
words, “just as rest presupposes motion and issues in motion, justice presupposes injustice and 
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issues in injustice.”16  
Yet the law-breaking feature of human nature cannot be the last word of war’s education; the 
“most advanced education” could not be an education on pure barbarianism or brutishness. The 
Peloponnesian war was marked as “the greatest commotion that ever happened among the 
Grecians” not only because of its unprecedented fierceness and destructiveness, but also due to 
the characteristics shared by the two major camps involved—the Greekness of both Athens and 
Sparta. The Peloponnesian war is great in the sense that it is the biggest barbarian conflict 
between two highly civilized cities. Both sides had the awareness of the tension between the 
nature and the laws; such awareness had been presented in their speeches and debates. Some 
arguers appealed to the divine laws while some others who were backing the human nature side 
appealed to “honor, fear and profit”17 but not to any irrational instinct.  
Nature and law: two alternative approaches to pursue the good 
The natural inclination to break laws has its own reason, a kind of reason about how to live a 
good life as a free individual, an individual out of any framework of laws, an individual dwelling 
in the Hobbesean state of nature. Every individuals tries to find a good way of life, while no one 
has adequate knowledge about the knowledge of the good.18 Therefore everyone lives only 
according to his own partial understanding of the good, which is insufficient even for the basic 
daily necessities, because many conflicts, or wars, would rise due to people’s opposing concepts 
of the good. In the beginning of his book, Thucydides has noted such conflicts and the 
subsequent ancient conventions, which could be very brutish. For example, as Thucydides 
depicted, piracy used to be an honorable job for certain islanders; and ancient Greece people 
needed to bear arms with them because danger was everywhere.19  
Laws provide an optional, and a political, answer to people’s request for the idea of good. Laws 
gain their authority from the gods, and they are even in a higher priority to the gods, because the 
gods give divine prescriptions to the cities while they are looking upon the idea of laws. Divinity 
seems to be a qualified authority to unify the content of the good; to obey the divine laws seems 
to be the sole promising way to build a perfect city. However, as Plato pointed out, people had 
never built a truly virtuous city based on given divine laws, and therefore the laws of city can be 
judged with a standard supplied by certain poems, rather than other laws.20 There was nothing 
higher in this divine scheme, i.e. the whole picture in which the laws rule all, the gods defend the 
laws and award them to citizens, and men build up cities based on the given laws. When the 
tangible earthly laws are questioned, the divinity of the whole scheme will be inevitably 
suspected as well. The occurrence of wars imposes such suspicion into the most urgent position. 
The laws are broken, and the treaties are breached; any argument trying to justify waging a battle, 
or to guarantee a triumph by appealing to justice, turns out to appear either hypocritical or naïve. 
That is because when the laws become ineffective, the standard of justice becomes invalid 
simultaneously as well. “As for mutual trust amongst them, it was confirmed not so much by 
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divine law as by the communication of guilt.”21 Also, as the Athenians more toughly pointed out, 
“in human disputation justice is only agreed on when the necessity is equal; whereas they that 
have odds of power exact as much as they can, and the weak yield to such conditions as they can 
get.”22 However, in wartime, the necessities of both sides are rarely equal, hence the possibility 
to appeal to justice is always lacking.   
After it rejects the power of divine laws, war creates a certain kind of necessity. This necessity is 
not only about the fear for extinction--it is rather an urgent need for a miraculous alternative 
guidance of action when law’s justice does not work. As Thucydides wrote, it is the necessity to 
“conformeth most men’s passions to the present occasion.” War as the most radical form of 
motion, leaves no room for contemplation or hesitation. One must decide what is more preferable 
among all possible options as quickly as he can. Peace leads necessarily to admiration of 
antiquity, while war leads to focal attention on the present.23 Making decisions only based on a 
consideration about how to survive in the present, necessarily means to reason as individuals 
freed from convention, laws and the authority of the divine, i.e. as a natural rational beings—no 
rules, free play. Every player has to concentrate on only one new question: what is good for me 
right here, right now? Any claim appealing to the previous shared justice comes to be a fraud24. 
As the Mytilenaeans suggested to the Spartans, “if it appear that your endeavor is to make [the 
Greeks] free, your strength in this war will be much the more confirmed.”25 Justice becomes 
from the highest end to no more than a fancy excuse.  
However, the conversion from peacetime view to wartime view is too radical to be completely 
done. The concern with justice and divine laws does not disappear in a second after the war 
breaks out. It keeps stretching people’s consideration away from the call of nature. The sense of 
guilt aroused by abandoning the divine laws haunted everyone all the time. When the 
Corcyraeans ask the Athenians to protect them from the Corinthians, they needed to emphasize 
that by doing so the Athenians would not breach their divine treaties with the Spartans26. When 
Archidamus tried to stop Spartans from waging a war, while Sthenelaidas tried to urge them to 
do so, both of them put their last words onto the divine laws. Archidamus said “one that offereth 
himself to judgment may not lawfully be invaded as a doer of injury before the judgment be 
given”27, while Stheneilaidas said “let us …in the name of the Gods proceed against the doer of 
injustice.”28 Though the spoken arguments maybe not reveal the truest reason, it still shows that 
the concern on the divine laws and justice does matter; otherwise there would be no need to 
claim so. Two more convincing examples are about actions rather than speeches, the example of 
Alcidas. He was told that “it was but an ill manner of setting the Grecians at liberty to kill such 
as had not lift up their hands against him nor were indeed enemies to the Peloponnesians but 
confederates to the Athenians by constrainst, and that, unless he gave over that course, he would 
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make few of the enemies his friends but many now friends to become his enemies.”29 Before he 
was told so, such a simple thought had never occurred to him or any other Spartan, because 
Spartans always killed in such circumstances, which was taught by their laws.30 Even in the late 
period of the war, the Spartans still believed that their justice is critical to their military success. 
“Arms should not be carried against such as would stand to trial of judgment, they [Spartans] 
refused such trial when the Athenians offered it; and they thought all their misfortunes had 
deservedly befallen them for that cause… the Spartans, conceiving the Athenians to be in the 
same fault that themselves had been in before, betook themselves earnestly to the war.”31 The 
concerns on justice never totally fade away as such.  
The most advanced education of war 
The coexistence of both the laws and the nature on the battlefield makes the education of war the 
most advanced one. Indeed, the first thing war teaches is one alternative approach to grasp the 
idea of the good, i.e. the approach of natural reason. The outbreak of war compels people to live 
on without the restrains of the laws, and therefore provided a rare opportunity for them to 
manifest their violent nature. Yet such an exposition of human nature cannot be qualified as a 
higher, let alone the highest, education compared with the education of laws. It is because that 
these two kinds of education are parallel; the radical change of concern into natural reason still 
was not able to eliminate people’s appeal to the divine laws in the war time. A higher education, 
or the most advanced education, is the education about the tension between these two kinds of 
appeals—the appeal to the nature, and the appeal to the laws. This tension becomes clearly 
visible only when the natural reason shows its power violently in the war time.  
Such tension, as the call of human nature, is not created but intensely exposed by war. The 
law-breaking nature is always there. In the peace time, it is represented in some other forms; 
some forms non-violent but no less destructive to the divine laws, such as the form of 
philosophical thinking. War teaches about violence, while philosophy teaches about madness or 
frenzy.32 They both question the divine laws; therefore question the foundation of the city, of 
politics. In peace time, the madness of philosophy cannot easily overrule the decrees of the 
divine laws; philosophers never become powerful kings. They could be sentenced to death as 
was Socrates, for their preaching of madness by the political power of the city. War, however, the 
violent teacher, forces people to turn to natural reason and to question the laws and the gods. 
Thucydides did not believe that the gods avenge injustice and he never mentioned such a case. 
The laws and the gods, according to Thucydides’ attitude, had to be questioned.  
In the sense that war presents the tension between the natural reason and the legislative reason, or 
in other terms, the philosophical reason and the political reason, Thucydides’ take on the 
Peloponnesian war’s greatness becomes obvious to understand. The kept question, how 
Peloponnesian war’s greatness can be decided by its bigness, can be solved. Its bigness implies a 
more clear and comprehensive presentation of the tension; both Sparta and Athens’ 
accomplishment before the war, the climax of the Greekness, presents this tension in the sharpest 
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manner. Moreover, the greatness of this war, or any war, also closely related to the ultimateness 
of the tension itself. All the conflicts defining the extremes of human affairs, such as motion vs. 
rest, war vs. peace, moderation vs. madness, barbarism and Greekness, all of them derive from 
the tension between natural reason and political reason. “By understanding the biggest unrest 
Thucydides understands the limits of human possibilities. His knowledge is final knowledge.”33 
War’s education, therefore could be regarded as the most advanced education for all the political 
philosophers, if they obtain such a title only due to their awareness of the tension between 
political reason and philosophical reason. War’s teaching about the tension is the most advanced 
one, because only in war can this tension be fully seen. No any single political philosopher can 
show this tension by openly questioning his city’s laws and gods. War, on the other hand, is able 
to push every one into that position with no threat from any kind of violence—war itself is 
violence. Political philosophers may suffer for their sanity, while wars never will. 
As to the first question raised in the beginning, why Thucydides first of all identified himself as 
an Athenian, the answer may be also connected to his teaching about the tension between two 
contrary kinds of reasons. Athens is a second best circumstance to present the tension other than 
the war. Among all the Athenians, there were both the ambassador who claimed to the Spartans 
that the motives of war can only be honor, fear and profit, i.e. no justice, another ambassador 
who claimed to the Melians that gods only help the stronger34; and, on the other hand, the most 
admired gentleman Nicias, who was respected for his lawfulness and piety. With an insight about 
the significance of the ultimate tension, the unsolvable dilemma, between two kinds of reasons, 
Thucydides must have seen how representative both the Peloponnesian war and the case of 
Athens can be. Only with an understanding on Thucydides’ insight into the classical tension 
disclosed in Athens and the Peloponnesian war, his remarks in the beginning of his book that this 
war was the greatest war, plus that his book would be a possession of all generations, would 
show to us nothing exaggerating, but only the author’s deepest wisdom. 
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